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Abstract: European courts and legal scholars are accustomed to construing 
codes that have been in place for long periods of time. In the U.S., most laws 
are recent enough that the meanings of their words have not changed very 
much over time. This, however, is not true of the Constitution, which was 
adopted in the late 18th century. There are debates in the U.S. about how 
faithful current interpreters of the Constitution should be to the original 
meaning of the Constitution’s language, and over what it means to be faithful 
to the original meaning of the Constitution’s language. Should we care about 
what the original drafters had in mind, or about how the public that voted on 
the Constitution understood the language? Scholars and judges have turned to 
old dictionaries for help. Now, however, corpus linguistics has entered the 
scene, including a new corpus of general 18th century English. In this paper, I 
will suggest that scholars and judges interested in the meanings of the words 
as then understood should put themselves in the position of lexicographers 
writing a bilingual dictionary that translates the terms from a foreign language 
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into contemporary English. Such a stance will bring out the many difficult 
problems in using a corpus as a means of making legal decisions today. 
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WSZYSCY JESTEŚMY TŁUMACZAMI: WYKŁADNIA 
KONSTYTUCYJNA JAKO TŁUMACZENIE. 
Abstrakt: Inaczej niż europejskie, większość amerykańskich regulacji 
prawnych została stworzona na tyle niedawno, że terminologia użyta 
w tekstach prawodawczych nie zdążyła jeszcze zmienić swojego znaczenia. Ta 
reguła nie tyczy się jednak konstytucji Stanów Zjednoczonych, która została 
sformułowana w końcu XVIII w. W Stanach Zjednoczonych trwają obecnie 
dyskusje nad tym, czy właściwie interpretuje się konstytucję oraz jak jej 
współczesne rozumienie ma się do jej pierwotnego znaczenia. Czy 
powinniśmy skupiać się na pierwotnym znaczeniu terminów użytych przez 
autorów konstytucji czy na tym jak te terminy są rozumiane przez ogół 
współczesnego społeczeństwa, który głosował za przyjęciem konstytucji? 
Obecnie, w czasach popularności językoznawstwa korpusowego i po 
stworzeniu rozległego korpusu XVII wiecznej angielszczyzny znalezienie 
odpowiedzi na to pytanie może być możliwe. 
 
Słowa klucze: językoznawstwo korpusowe, język prawny, legilingwistyka 
 
Legal translation has become a big industry. In 2013, the 
translation budget for the EU was announced to be €330 million.1 
Translation is a necessary part of both conducting business and 
resolving legal problems between legal systems that operate in different 
languages. When a dispute arises between a French company and a U.S. 
company over a contract, the relevant evidence, including the contract 
itself, must be available in the language of the legal system resolving 
the dispute. It is a necessary part of both conducting business and 
resolving problems that occur across a single multi-lingual legal 
system, such as those in Canada, Belgium, Switzerland and the 
European Union. In this article, I wish to explore two other 
circumstances that can be said to be a matter of legal translation: 
disputes within a monolingual legal system in which the official or 
working language has remained constant, but has changed over time, 
                                                     
1 http://one-europe.info/translation-in-the-european-union-facts-and-figures. 
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and more generally, the activity of legal construction as a form of 
translation. 
1. Comparative Law as Translation 
Comparative law has always been seen as a matter of 
translation, with significant discussion of terms that are similar, but not 
equivalent. To take a well-studied example, “consideration” in the 
common law of contracts relates to, but is not the same as “causa” in 
civilian law (for recent discussion, see Stoyanov 2016, Zweigert and 
Kötz 1996:43). The legal world is not only multilingual but also 
multijural, rendering accurate translation difficult, if not impossible, 
when concepts in one system are not present in another. 
 For this reason, comparativists focus more on functional 
fidelity than on linguistic equivalence (Zweigert and Kötz 1996). 
Without taking into account the differences between the legal cultures, 
there really is no point in expecting concepts that exist on one legal 
system but not a second system to have any legitimate translation into 
the language of the latter. Yet, as Hendry (2014: 100) points out, 
“partial understanding is preferable to no understanding at all.” Thus, 
translators do the best they can to convey at least the gist of what is 
being said in the source language. For example, commentators note that 
efforts to make English the lingua franca of the international legal 
community soon confront the problem that much of the terminology in 
English is based on common law principles, and do not carry over to 
civilian systems without a great deal of effort (see, e.g., Husa 2012: 
174). I will not explore these issues further here because as interesting 
and challenging as they are, their presence is well-known. 
2. Translation in Multilingual Legal Systems 
 By the same token, multilingual legal systems rely heavily 
various methods of seeing to it that the laws enacted in many languages 
all say the same thing – or at least as close as possible to reaching that 
goal. In Canada, at least some legislation is “co-drafted,” meaning that 
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it is simultaneously drafted in both French and English, with the goal 
of having equivalent results regardless of which version of the law is 
applied in a particular case. Yet Canada’s legal system itself is 
bijural(common law and civil law) as well as being bilingual, a fact that 
challenges drafters to use terminology that does not imply the 
predominance of one system over the other (Sullivan 2004). 
 Nonetheless, problems of non-equivalence arise regularly in 
the Canadian courts, which use the “shared meaning rule” as a default 
principle, generally leading to a narrow interpretation of a law whose 
scope is disputed. The Supreme Court of Canada describes the process: 
First, the English and French versions may be irreconcilable... . Second, 
one version may be ambiguous while the other is plain and unequivocal. 
The shared meaning will then be that of the version that is plain and 
unambiguous. Third, one version may have a broader meaning than the 
other. … “[W]here one of the two versions is broader than the other, the 
common meaning would favour the more restricted or limited 
meaning".2 
Problems quickly arise, however, when extrinsic evidence 
suggest that the legislature did not intend the narrower interpretation. 
(See Beaupré 1988; Macdonald 1997; Sullivan 2004). 
The courts are aware of this possibility, and are willing to 
impose a teleological approach over the shared meaning rule when it 
appears that the narrower interpretation will undermine the intent of the 
legislature or the purpose of the statute. In some instances, courts may 
impose a “compromise” interpretation, consistent with neither the 
French nor the English versions. For example, a Canadian law specifies 
the conditions for a business paying reduced postage rates for bulk 
mailings. The English version of the relevant regulation referred to the 
“principal business” of an organization, suggesting that the rates apply 
only to profit-making enterprises. The French version, in contrast, 
applied to “l’activitéprincipale,” which could be just about anything. In 
a 1985 case,3the court held that the rates are available only to 
businesses, but the businesses need not be for-profit in nature. Neither 
version actually carries this understanding as its literal meaning. While 
the shared meaning rule provides a formalism for resolving disputes 
                                                     
2 R. v. Caisse Popular, [2009] S.C.R. 29 at paragraph 84 (internal citations 
omitted). 
3Aeric Inc. v. Chairman of the Bd. of Dir., Canada Post Corp., [1985] 1 F.C. 
127.  
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over differences in meaning between language versions, the court 
actually adopts an essentialist approach. The goal is to uncover the core 
of meaning that the legislature intended to enact, and to construe the 
law in a manner most likely to further the law’s essence. 
 The European Union, in contrast, relies on the legal fiction that 
all 24 versions of the law, each of which being both equivalent and 
equally authoritative to all the others, were drafted simultaneously (see 
Leung 2014). They were not. There is a complicated protocol spelling 
out which versions are to be translated into which other versions. 
Recognizing this hierarchy, however, would give priority to the 
language in which the law was originally drafted (often English, see 
Baaij 2015), and threaten the legitimacy of the principle that all 
versionsareequally authoritative. Thus, apart from early cases decided 
decades ago, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) almost 
never refers to the translation history of a law when it renders a decision 
that concerns differences among the language versions. Here again, 
translators are encouraged to use terms that do not imply the acceptance 
of one legal culture over others, creating a vocabulary of European legal 
terminology (Kjær 2015). 
 Problems of legal translation in these contexts are well-studied. 
(See Ainsworth 2014, Kjær 2007, 2015, Baaij 2012 a and b, Leung 
2014, Šarčević 2012 for recent work). Reasonably enough, the literature 
focuses mostly on the many difficulties that legal translators encounter 
in their futile quest for equivalence. To take one example from the EU,4 
a directive regulated “the letting of premises and sites for parking 
vehicles.” A Danish company, which was letting a site for boats, 
claimed that it was not covered by the regulation since the word 
“vehicles” is best understood as referring to land vehicles. Reviewing 
various language versions, the ECJ found no consensus. In some 
languages (French, English, Italian, Spanish, German and Finnish) the 
word seemed to apply to all modes of transport. In others (Danish, 
Swedish, Dutch and Greek), its most common meaning is limited to 
vehicles that run on land. Thus, the court resorted to the teleological 
approach and decided that the purpose behind the directive would be 
better served if boats were included within the scope of the directive 
(See Cao 2007: 74-75). 
                                                     
4 Case C-428/02, Fonden MarselisbordLystbådehavn v. Skatteministeriet , 
2005 ECR I-1527. 
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The case has special jurisprudential appeal because the facts 
closely resemble those of the famous debate between H.L.A. Hart 
(1958) and Lon Fuller (1958) over the circumstances in which “no 
vehicles in the park” applies.5Superficially, the question there is what it 
means for a thing to be a vehicle. However, as scholars have noted, the 
real issue is what should be considered a vehicle in the context of the 
statute, taking into account what the law was intended to cure. This 
inquiry requires more than reference to a dictionary. It requires inquiry 
into the purpose of the law, which includes an analysis of the expected 
uses of the parks in the community that enacts the law (Winter 2001, 
Eskridge 2016). 
 As Baaij (2012) points out there have been surprisingly few 
such cases confronting the CJEU over its first half century. This is not 
because translations are actually equivalent in all respects. Rather, the 
success reflects the fact that most of the time, the disputes are over 
issues for which the different language versions really are sufficiently 
equivalent. If a parking garage in Denmark had violated the directive, 
there would be no reason to care about the fact that the word ‘vehicle’ 
has different extensions in, say, Danish and Finnish, with respect to 
water vessels. Fortunately, European cultures are sufficiently similar to 
ensure that the prototypical examples of most legally-relevant concepts 
are not entirely distinct. And it is with respect to the prototypes (or 
“ordinary meaning” in legal parlance) that the legislation was enacted 
in the first place. 
Thus, as a practical matter, legal translation is relatively 
successful, notwithstanding the many problems articulated in the 
literature.When language versions appear to conflict, the court 
examines several of them, attempting to distinguish the mainstream 
from the outliers, and to eliminate the latter. It further attempts to 
determine a core of common ground and to relate the various versions 
to the purpose underlying the law’s enactment. I have referred to this 
method as “Augustinian Interpretation.” Augustine recommended 
placing different translations of the scriptures side by side and 
comparing them to determine their essential message, for those who 
were not fluent in the languages in which they were originally 
written(see Solan 2009, 2014 for further discussion). When the 
language versions diverge so there lacks a clearly superior trend, the 
                                                     
5 Hypotheticals include ambulances, bicycles, airplanes, and war memorials. 
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court resorts to the teleological method, choosing the language that best 
appears to advance the law’s purpose. 
Baaij (2012) notes further that the analysis is not conducted 
uniformly, which compromises the CJEU’s adherence to an important 
rule of law value. Nonetheless, the comparison of different language 
versions often tends to reveal a common thread that characterizes most 
of the versions, or to demonstrate the need to look past language. 
 The remainder of this article looks at two seemingly 
monolingual situations as additional matters of translation. The first, 
relevant both to civilian lawyers interpreting codes and U.S. lawyers 
construing the Constitution, involves changes in language over time. 
3. Constitutional Law as Translation 
The U.S. Constitution is an eighteenth century document. 
English grammar has not changed much since then,but vocabulary has, 
including the meanings of words current then, and still current today. 
To take an example explored by both Jack Balkin (2011)and Lawrence 
Solum (2015), the Constitution makes reference to “domestic 
violence”:  
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Formof Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and onApplication of the Legislature, or of the Executive 
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic 
Violence.”6 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines domestic violence 
as: “Physical or emotional abuse of a household member, especially 
one's spouse or domestic partner.” That, however, is not what was 
meant in Article IV of the Constitution. Rather, the clause guarantees 
that the federal government will come to the assistance of a state that is 
experiencing armed insurrection against state authority. As Mark Stein 
(2009: 132) points out, the word “domestic” – then as now – had/has 
two meanings: “not foreign” and “relating to the house.” If the framers 
wrote the clause with the first meaning in mind, and it was so 
understood, it would not be legitimate to switch to the second meaning 
                                                     
6 U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, § 4, cl. 4. 
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in order to bring spousal abuse within the scope of this constitutional 
protection of state authority. 
 If someone unfamiliar with any of these historical facts were to 
hear, “the U.S. Constitution concerns itself with curbing domestic 
violence,” it is very likely that the hearer would today (mis)understand 
the statement as referring to violence within the home. It is a common 
expression. Following earlier work of Lawrence Lessig (1993), I 
propose that the process by which the hearer becomes disabused of this 
contemporary understanding and attuned to the historical fact is a 
matter of translation. The claim is a strong one. The process is not like 
translation, it actually is translation. Just as one translates Old English 
into Modern English, one translates Modern English into Eighteenth 
Century English. 
 Translators make decisions. Calling constitutional 
interpretation “translation” thus suggests that the kinds of decisions that 
legal analysts must make are the same as the kinds of decisions that 
translators must make. These include the legally significant concern as 
to whether conceptual fidelity requires that the expected applications of 
the term in the target language be preserved. For example, the 
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishments” in the Eighth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution did not ban the death penalty in 
the eighteenth century. Capital punishment was clearly permitted. 
However, the notion of “cruelty,” then as now, meant/means something 
like “harsher than societal norms permit.” If the translator focuses on 
conceptual equivalence without regard to application, then changes in 
societal norms and fidelity to original meaning are not in tension, as 
theorists including Balkin (2011), Solum (2015) and Whittington 
(1999) point out. In contrast, the late Justice Antonin Scalia (1997: 46, 
132, 145-146) argued that the availability of the death penalty in the 
eighteenth century ensured it a place in the arsenal of punishments 
permanently. 
 More generally, the translator must balance textual fidelity 
against functional fidelity. Languages do not always translate literally, 
requiring translator to choose words and syntactic structures in the 
target language that will produce the same result as the words in the 
source language. This is especially true when the contexts of the two 
differ significantly, either because of the passage of time or because of 
contemporaneous differences. Obvious cases include the translation of 
monetary language. Consider the following example discussed by 
Lessig (1993: 1176-1178): An 1864 law set ten dollars as the maximum 
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fee that lawyers could charge a veteran for bringing a claim for benefits. 
A case arose in 1985 under that statute. Should the court have enforced 
the $10.00 ceiling, or adjusted it to an amount reflecting equivalent 
purchasing power 120 years later? The Supreme Court chose the 
former,7 literal path, which Lessig argues was a mistake. The purpose 
of the law was make sure that legal fees for such claims were 
inexpensive, not to bankrupt lawyers over the centuries.  
Lessig’s turning from a textual to a functional perspective on 
translation makes sense as a matter of fidelity to the intent of the 
drafters.The same holds true in the realm of constitutional analysis. The 
Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ensures the right to a jury 
trial in certain non-criminal cases: 
“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law.” 
Most discussion of this provision concern what “suits at common law” 
means. It is generally understood to refer to cases brought at “law” 
rather than “equity” in Britain at the time of the founding of the United 
States. But the term “dollar” is also a mystery. Since the United States 
was not minting money until after the Constitution was adopted, one 
needs to construe the word “dollar” as referring to some other currency. 
American legal scholars have come to the understanding that 
the term “dollar” in the Seventh Amendment refers to the Spanish silver 
dollar, in wide circulation in the colonies at the time of the founding. 
One scholar (Khan 1999: 403, note 57)8describes the situation as 
follows: 
“At the time of adoption of the Constitution, Spanish, French, English, 
and Portuguese coins were in wide circulation and constituted the 
money supply of the United States. Although some gold was current, 
silver coins alone were legally recognized in colonial times. Of all 
foreign coins, the Spanish milled silver dollar was, and for decades had 
been, the money of American markets. The Spanish milled silver dollar 
was also the unit of common account. Accordingly, market 
transactions, exchange rates for other foreign coins, and contracts were 
measured in terms of Spanish dollars. As no national coins existed when 
the Constitution was framed, one may safely conclude that the dollar 
                                                     
7 Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
8 Internal citations omitted. 
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mentioned in the Constitution was a unit equivalent to the Spanish 
silver. The Act of 1792, which established the United States Mint, 
further clarified the Constitution by defining dollar as a unit of account 
in value and weight similar to the Spanish milled dollar”. 
Most legal translation, consistent with Lessig’s perspective, is 
target-oriented. Surely, no one takes the position that lawsuits in the 
United States must be appraised in terms of the eighteenth century 
currency of Spain to determine whether the right to a jury trial exists. 
The goal is to make the concepts in the source document accessible and 
sensible to the audience reading the translation in the target language.  
But this approach is controversial. Baaij (2015) has argued that 
source-oriented translation, even with itsawkwardness in the target 
language, is more transparent in that it flags for the reader passages in 
which nonequivalence creates conceptual difficulty. Stylistic elegance 
gives way to as much literal accuracy as much as is practical. Moreover, 
sometimes, especially in the context of very specific provisions, the 
word really do seem to mean what they say. Yet there are times when 
words simply mean what they say. The Constitution requires that an 
individual be at least 35 years old to serve as President of the United 
States. No one would suggest that because the purpose for this 
requirement is to ensure a certain level of maturity, that an especially 
mature twenty-eight year old person should be permitted to serve. 
Such examples do not undermine the notion that constitutional 
interpretation is a matter of translation. If, say, the way we compute age 
had changed over the two centuries since the adoption of the 
Constitution (perhaps considering a newborn to be one at the time of 
birth, consistent with some Asian traditions), there would at the very 
least be legitimate debate over whether to measure age the old way or 
the new way. 
Currently, constitutional scholars writing in the “originalist” 
framework argue that the words of the Constitution should be construed 
consistent with their “original public meaning” at which time the 
content of the Constitution was “fixed”(see Solum 2015). This suggests 
an “ordinary meaning” approach as of the time that the country was 
founded. The important task for the interpreter (or translator) is to 
determine how those who ultimately voted to ratify the Constitution 
most likely understood its words. Thus, it is argued, it is more important 
come to grips with how words were used at the time generally, than to 
speculate about the particular meaning that the drafters had in mind. 
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This position, too, is controversial. Statutes are generally 
construed with the presumption that the legislature uses words in their 
ordinary sense (see Slocum 2015). This approach no doubt should apply 
to some instances of constitutional language as well. However, it is not 
at all clear that the approach should be considered the norm for 
constitutional analysis. Perhaps rightrs should be construed broadly as 
a matter of principle, and limitations on rights narrowly. As noted 
earlier, there is disagreement as to whether the concept, “cruel and 
unusual punishments” should include the list of punishments that were 
impermissible in the eighteenth century, or be understood as a concept 
whose general meaning is constant but whose boundaries may change 
over time (see Dworkin 1988 for discussion of the difference between 
concepts and conceptions in this regard). 
Translation of constitutional terms across time is no easy feat. 
The starting point is clear enough: coming to grips with the range of 
available meanings in the source (older) language. However, that is just 
the beginning of the process. One must then decide what to do with this 
information. Construe the term broadly? Narrowly? Adopt an atypical 
usage in order to make the most sense of the language in context? If so, 
what contextual information should be considered? How should it be 
weighted? 
One excellent tool used by translators and lexicographers is the 
linguistic corpus. The corpus, however, can only provide distributional 
information about word usage (see Kosem 2016). It cannot tell the legal 
analyst what to do with that information. Because there is no agreed 
upon linguistic standard for construing constitutional language, I have 
argued that the creation of a corpus of founding era American English, 
while a good idea in its own right, is not likely to solve these problems 
on their own (compare Phillips, Ortner and Lee 2016 and Solan 2016). 
When it comes to constitutional law, in contrast, unless it is clear what 
linguistic questions we wish to ask the introduction of “big data” is not 
as helpful as it might be if the legal norms were uniform and well-
established. Surely in some sense we must concern ourselves with how 
the language was understood at the time of the founding. However, in 
what sense we must do that is a contested matter (compare 
Balkin’s2011 originalism with Solum’s 2015 originalism), and the 
corpus cannot help us resolve this dispute.  
Thus, we are back where we started. Constitutional 
analysis is indeed a matter of translation, but we must recognize 
that translators have to make decisions. Corpora are an excellent 
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source of information about distributional facts concerning 
language usage. But it is not clear how much we should rely on 
this distributional information in constitutional analysis, and if we 
do, it is also not clear which distributional facts are legally 
relevant. While the interpretive problems are linguistic in nature, 
the decisions about how to resolve them are legal and political. 
4. Extending the Paradigm 
In his brilliant book, Justice as Translation, James Boyd White 
(1990: 236) argues that all legal analysis is a matter of translation, at 
the very least an extension of translation: 
“Interpretation is directly continuous with translation, for one who seeks 
to make a text in response to a text in his own language must inhabit his 
own version of the translator’s space, knowing that it is impossible to 
reproduce the meaning of the prior text except in the words of the prior 
text, in its context, yet knowing as well that conversations can take place 
about such texts in which they are for some purposes, and in some ways, 
usefully represented in other terms”. 
Any time an issue in a matter of statutory interpretation leads 
to a statement of the form, “for purposes of this statute, the word x 
should be limited to situations in which y obtains,” the interpreter, in 
essence is creating an entry n a bilingual dictionary. Of course this is 
more obvious when the words are in different languages, or even when 
they are in the same language, but separated by enough time to allow 
the words to have changed in meaning. Notably, as both Schauer (2015) 
and Durant (forthcoming) point out, many of the hardest cases of 
translation of this sort are instances in which legal and everyday 
meaning overlap, but are not identical. Translation theorists writing 
about multilingual legal systems make a similar point, as the example 
of causa and consideration discussed above illustrates. 
The translation about which White speaks is creates a bridge 
between two linguistic cultures, reflecting different social institutions. 
Most frequently the bridge joins the world of legal categories and the 
world of everyday experience. The question, then, is not whether a 
bicycle is a vehicle, or even whether it is ordinarily regarded as a 
vehicle for purposes of deciding whether a law that bans vehicles from 
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a public park applies to cyclists. Rather, the issue is whether, given the 
nature of the park and the purpose of the law, bicycle accidents are 
among the risks that are to be averted.Automobile traffic will be 
prohibited by any such law, not only because cars are prototypical 
vehicles, but also because they create the prototypical risk when it 
comes to park safety. 
In many instances, however, the law defaults to the 
presumption that the legislature uses ordinary words in their ordinary 
sense (see Solan 2010, Slocum 2015, Eskridge 2016), thus making such 
tools as linguistic corpora of natural language especially useful in 
statutory interpretation (Mouritsen 2010), although at least in the 
United States, judges continue to rely on both dictionaries and their own 
intuitions about the distributional facts. The presumption that the 
legislature uses words in their ordinary sense not only enhances fidelity 
to the legislature to the extent that the presumption accurately reflects 
the legislative process, but it further enhances the rule of law value that 
the public be given fair notice of their obligations, since the 
presumption defaults to the understanding of the statutory language 
most likely to be in the minds of the public at the time of enactment.In 
these cases, translation is a rather straightforward task, provided that 
the interpreter can marshal sufficient information about how the terms 
are used in everyday life. 
5. Conclusion 
I have presented four different contexts in which legal actors are said to 
engage in translation: comparative law analysis, the functioning of 
multilingual legal systems, the interpretation of older documents, and 
ordinary interpretation of laws contemporary laws. In so doing, I do not 
mean to obscure the differences among these contexts. Self-evidently, 
there is a difference between bridging the gap between one concept in 
French and another in English, and bridging the gap between two 
contexts in which a single term is used contemporaneously. 
Nonetheless the similarities among these interpretive contexts are 
instructive, and more than metaphorical. In short, James Boyd White is 
correct: Legal analysis, whether across legal systems, across languages 
within a single legal system, across time within a single language, or 
across subcultures within a single linguistic environment, share a great 
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deal. This fact certainly does not mean that the acts of translation are 
precisely the same in each of these contexts. It does, however, suggest 
that certain mental operations are essential to a variety of legal tasks, 
which appear superficially to be unrelated. 
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